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This paper illustrates the close affinity between the critical theorist's
depiction of the authoritarian personality andJean-Paul Sanre'sportrait
of the anti-semite and critically examines thesolutions to theproblem
of anti-semitism these thinkers suggest. In order to accomplish these
goalsan extended discussion ofSartre's viewsonfreedom and bad-faith
isalso presented.
'The Jew only serves him [the anti-semite} as a pretext; elsewhere his
counterpart willmake use of theNegro or the man ofyellow sldn.'~
Jean-Paul Sartre (1948: 54).
Introduction
This essay will attempt to draw a charactersketch of thepersonalityof anti-
semites in the hope that this sketch will point to ways in which the problem of
anti-semitism mightbe reduced.
In order to draw this character sketch this essay will draw on previous
character sketches of the personality of anti-semites. Specificly this essay will
draw on the sketch described as the authoritarian personality by the critical
theorists,Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford in their book of the
same name, and Jean-Paul Sartre's sketchcreated in And-Semite andJew. Many
importantpoints of congruencebetweenSartreand Adornoet ale willbepointed
out as a synthesisof their views is constructed.
Two seeming digressions from the main topic of this essay will have- to -
made inorder to c!3!i:fy thesketches of both the critical theorists and Sartre, I~
order to explain Sartre's sketch of the personalityof anti-semites this essay will
devote its first section to an attempt to construct what we shall refer to as
Same's social psychology. In order to clarifybothSartre's sketch and especially
the sketch presented by the critical theorists this essay will devote its second
section to a brief enumeration of the historical conditions within which past
anti-semiticmovements found fertilesoil.
There are several things this essay will not do which need to be made clear
since they point to the limitations of this investigation. Although this essay
will sketch some of the history of the era in which the critical theorists and
Sartre wrote, no attempt will be made to reconstruct the specific historical
developmentsof anti-semitic movements in the United States or Europe. Thus
this essay will not give a historical argumentto explain the development of anti-
semitism.
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This essay will also lack any extended discussion of the social movements
perspective on anti-semitism. In spite of the importance of looking at anti-
semitic movements from a social movements perspective, the critical theorists
and Sartre were interested in approaching anti-semitism from a different angle.
Rather than concentrate on different social backgrounds in an effort to explain
why some people become anti-semites, the critical theorists wanted to know
why certain people of similar social backgroundschoose to become anti-semites
and others choose not to become anti-semites. The critical theorists and Same
felt the answer to this questionlay in character structure.
This essay will also lack an empirical psychological study of contemporary
Americans and Europeans. This is important because even if the- critical
theoristsempirically discovereda personality type that was more susceptible to
anti-semiticpropaganda than most, that personality type may no longer exist in
the contemporary world. It is the belief of the essayist, however, that once one
considers what the critical theorists argued were the origins of the authoritarian
personality,that it indeed still exists.
All of these disclaimerswill hopefully beanswered in a future work.
Finally, the assumptions of this essay should be made explicit This essay
is not a value-free exercise in social psychology. We assume that anti-semitism
is an ethically repugnant feature of our world. We assume that people have
various personalities and that there may be a personality type which is more
susceptible to anti-semitic propaganda than most. And we assume that it is
desirable 10 attempt to fmd ways in which to curb this tide of hate.
SARlRE'S SOCIAL PSYCHOLOOY:
Human beings. as Jean-Paul Sartre wrote, are "condemned to be
free."(Sartre, (1956) 1975: 353). The question is, what exactly does this
condemnation 10 be free mean?
Sartreargues that "existence precedesessence"(Sartre (1956) 1975: 348). By
existence precedingessenceSartre meansthat there is no transcendentessence of
-what it means -tobe- -human- preceeding-life.- Thus Sartre argues that human
beings have no transcendent "human nature" which determines them: first we
exist as human beings, and only then do we decide (of-letothers decide-for us) -
what this existence as a human being means (Sartre (1956) 1975: 348-350). In
other words, human beings are in some important sense free to decide what it
means for them to exist: what meaning life has for them; what meaning death
has for them.
Moreover, by the "condemnation" to be free Sartre means that we cannot
escape from having 10 choose (or let others choose for us) what it means for us
to exist, Indeed, Sartre will refer to all actions by us to attempt 10 posit that
there is some transcendentmeaningor humanessence to life as acts of bad-faith
(or self-deception). Before discussingbad-faith, however, it will help to clarify
what Sartre is not arguing, as well as to explore what he means when he writes
-that humanshave no "excuses" for theiractions.
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. S~e is not arguing that the meaning weattach to our lives is a-socialor a-
historical. S~e u.nderstands human beingsin a social psychological way, i.e.,
as cr~tures ~hlch ~nteract with eachother and influence each other'sconception
of their self Including feelings of self-worth (Sartre, 1956: 301-303). Indeed,
Sartre goes so f~ as lC! arg~e that in order to understand human beings "it is
necess~,lo consider biological, ~sy~hical, and social phenomena in a spirit of
sy~thesls '(Sartre, 1948: 59). This IS hardly an a-sociological or a-historical
point of view.
For.S~e, however, it is of grave importance not to forget that in addition
to the biological, psychological and sociological context within whicha person
fin~ oneself, that person makes free choices. One choosesamongstanarray of
op~ons Ito cre~e ~ne's self (Sartre(1956) 1975: 350)] despite the fact that these
op~ons .are .dellmlted by the synthesis of one's biological, psychological and
SOCIal suuanon,
M~reover, according to Sartre, if humans are free, then they are responsible
for their own actions(Sartre,(1956) 1975:353). In other wordshumans have no
excuses.
. In ~xi~tenlialism is a Humanism [or as Sartre actually titled it, Is
EXlstentla~lSma Humanism? (Contat & Rybalka, 1974: 133)], Sartre explains
more precl~ly what he means by human beings having no excuses by drawing
on Soren Kierkegaard's text Fear and Trembling. This essayshall move back
and forth betweenKierkegaard's textand Sartre's readingof that text
In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard tellsus thestory of Abraham and Isaac:
the story of the sac~fice of Isaac whichAbraham was commanded by an angelof
~od to.perform ~Klerkegaard, 1985: 45). Kierlcegaard reminds us that Abraham
IS conslde~ed Pf81sewo~y for his great faith(Kierkegaard, 1985: 49-56). Rather
thanquesuon God, or disobey God, or evenshowup late for thesacrificebecause
of doubtsand despair, Abraham takes Isaac to MountMoriahto besacrificed.
And yet, the same God which commanded Abraham to sacrificeIsaac was
~o the G?d which commanded the Israelites not to kill (murder). Kierkegaard
raises the Is~ue"thro~ghout the-~xt of Fear and Trembling as to whetheror "not
Abraham might not mdeedquestion whethertheangel whichcommanded him to
sacrifice Isaac was indeed- an- Angel of God. Might notone wonder if'such an
Angelwasof Lucifer?
Kierkegaard concludes that Abraham bad faith. but that Abraham's faith
cannot be understood withoutalsounderstanding hisanguish.
''The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he was willing to murder
Isaac; the religious expression is that he was willing to sacrifice Isaac; but in
this contradiction lies ...anguish" (Kierkegaard, 1985: 60).
. What doe~ the ~guish of Abraham mean? For Sartre (and not necessarily
Kierkegaard, Since Kierkegaard makes his famous leap to faith in the christian
G~) the anguish of Abraham would seem to be the anguish of all human
beings. The situation of humans is one in which people are forced to make
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decisions day after day without "true" recourse to any divine foundation,
scientific foundation,social foundation, nor any "systematic" foundation for their
decisions: The point is that even when God or science or society commands.us
to do something, we are still free in an important sense, for we have to decide
whether or not we shall obey.
This places the entire weight of our existence squarely upon our shoulders
(Sartre, (1956) 1975: 349-350). In the final analysis, we must make our own
decisions; we are responsible for thosedecisions, and we are without excuse for
those decisions, i.e.,we arecondemned to be free.
Moreover, Sartre argues that the nature of human' consciousness. is to be
conscious of the nothingness of itself (Sartre, KA, 1975: 299). By this Sartre
means that human beings are aware (in some fundamental way) o~ the"fact" th~t
they are not determined by any transcendent human natu~e, i.e., that their
consciousness is a nothingness before they exist. The question thus becomes,
do we have a selfwhich is given to us by our biology or society! . .
Sartre claims to be highly skeptical in regards to the quesu?n of.biological
inheritance (Sartre, 1948: 59), but with a great deal of quallfica.bon~ t.o ~
expanded on below the answer to the question of whether or not society gives
usa self is in some sense yes. .
At onepoint in Being andNothingness Sartre seems to refer to thisselfas
the "given" (Sartre, 1956: 615-6 & 611). Sartr~ argues .how~ver that
"consciousness is a pure and simple negation of the given, and It exists ~ the
disengagement from a certain given andas an engagement toward a.ce~ not
yet existing end" (Sanre, 1956: 615). What Sartre see~s to mean by.tlllS IS t!tat
though we have a "given" or a "self' we exist as consciousness by diseng~gmg
ourselves from this given, or by negating thisgiven. Furthennore, we exist as
consciousness by engaging ourselves in a project towards some future end (and
presumablya future given). .
Sartremakes his point more explicitwhen he explains that because human
consciounsess is a nothingness people attempt to fill this nothingness that they
.. .are,...by .negaung things or others.QUlSide.,.of.themselves .as that.wh~c_h Jbey are..
not (Same,(1956) 1975: 299). Bythis Sanremeans th~t human beln~s te~d to
~ define ·their sense of self by what they are.not-For example, as children we·
begin by realizing that we are not the ball, we are not mommy, etc. As adults
we continue in this vein by thoughts like, 'I am not a communist.'
People also attempt to fill the nothingness of their consciousness .by
affirmative statements (about who or what they are) as well as negative
statements (about who or what they are not). The range of these self-identifie~s
will of course be delimited by our societyt and others may choose to place such
identifiersupon us (and we may indeedchoose to agree with the identifiersoth~rs
place upon us). Sanre, however,sees all such self-identifiers as acts of bad~fatth
if we reify them into transcendent categories which define who we are, or If we
use them as an excuse for our actions. .
Bad-faith, according to Sartre, is an act in which one attempts to deceive
one's self about one's self (Sartre, (1956) 1975: 300.) In the case of an act of
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bad faith then, the liar and the duped are one and the same person (Sartre, (1956)
1975: 302).
The problem is, however, that insofar as one is conscious of one's self
engaging in an act of bad-faith (self-deception) one acts in good-faith (self-
honesty) (Sartre, (1956) 1975:302). Bad-faith thus "vacillates continually
between good faith and cynicism" (Sartre, (1956) 1975: 303). Because of this
vacillation, Sartre describes the existence of bad-faith as "metastable."
Nevertheless, bad-faith proves quite durable, and is quite common, according to
Sartre (Sartre, (1956) 1975: 302-303). The reason bad-faith is common would
appear to be simple, since at bottom it represents an attempt to escape from our
condemnation to be free (Sartre, (1956) 1975: 322).
In addition to others labeling us with their own definitions of our essence,
such as Jew, or ugly, or clever, others constitute "a real limit to our freedom"
(Sartre, 1956: 672).' For example, "Because I am a Jew I shall bedeprived-in
certain societies-of certain possibilities, etc." (Sartre, 1956: 671). This limit
to ourfreedom that others make for us occurs because theysee usassomeone we
have not chosen to be (Sartre, 1956: 672). "Still it is necessary to understand
this: the limit imposed does not come from the actibn of others" (Sartre, 1956:
672). Any action or prohibition done or placed upon us by others "can have
meaning only through the' foundation of my free choice. In fact. ..I can
disobey...pay no attention...[or] confer upon it [or them] a coercive value [or
force]" (Sartre, 1956: 672). In other words, it is not the specific actions of
others which places limits on my freedom, but rather my free choice to let their
actions or prohibitions decide for mewhat I shall do. Of course I may choose to
value my life or limb more than I value going against the other's actions or
prohibitions!
Thus the freedom which Sartre writes about should not be miscontmed as an
almighty capricious and unpredictablefreedom. Sanre argues instead that we are
absolutely free to choose to attempt to change ourselves or our situation in the
world, although we may indeed encounter circumstances which are so racked
'. .againstusas to deny-us ..the-freedom to succeed in ouraltempl·-(Sartre,1956·:··-····:;····~-;·"'-·..·
.62~-2). For example, "We shall not say that a prisoner is always free to go out
. . of prison tit which wouldbe the freedoin to succeed in one's projects, "but that he
is always free to try to escape," which is the freedom to choose one's projects
(Sartre, 1956: 622).
Sartre further argues that some projects (which we shall refer to as primary)
may constitute our character if we choose them to such an extent that they
determine our later decisions (Sartre, 1956: 584-5, & 705). In other words,
"character is a vow" (Sartre, 1956: 705) Note that we are still free to change in
the future but to change would mean to change at a great cost since we would
have to change our primary project (Sartre, 1956: 584-585). We should also
note that though others will attempt to "give" us a character by the identifiers
which they place upon us we still must make a decision to accept or attempt to
negate those identifiers of our character (Sartre, 1956: 705-6). In this decision
liesour freedom.
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N U· th t while we yet live it is impossible for anyone (includingo ce a . S . I· the fI s) to take away the freedom of which artre writes. t IS IS aspect 0~~;~ that might be refered to as a humanism, and which found a popular
audience in theattermathof WorldWar Il,
In order to more fully understand Sartre's work as well as the critical
theorists' work on anti-semitism this essay shall consider the social and
historical times in which they workedand in which anti-semitism flourished.
THE SOCIALAND HISTORICAL CONTEXTOF ANTI-SEMITISM:
Sartte was born in Paris in 1905. By the time he had written Being and
Nothingness in 1943, Sartre had lived through World War One as a youth, the
Spanish Civil War, and was now living through the Second World War. Sartre
had also lived throughthe "great"depressionand had seen the rise of bolshevism
in Russia. Needless to say, Sartre was living in an era of political and economic
upheaval and change: an era in which Nazism and anti-semitism would find
fertile soil.
The stark loss of life alone was "the most obvious and immediate"
consequence of World War I where eight million Europeans were killed, and
seven million pennanently disabled (Kitchen, 1988: 22). No doubt the most
obviouseffect on the everydaylives of those who survivedeither world war was
thesimple loss of life and limb all around them.
Between the wars values and lifestyles change in several non-trivial ways.
Divorce rates doubled and associated with this change in family structure was a
general "loosening of mom!saandards"along with a rise in urbanization(Kitchen,
1988: 23).
Despiteall the scientificand technological advances being made around the
world, the ability of politicians. social scientists, and philosophers to stabilize
economiesand keep Europefrom war was far from adequate. The faith in reason
and progress, fosteredduringthe Enlightenment, faltered,as reason and scientific
advances were shown to be as applicable to the desttuction of life, as they were
to life's enhancement(Lavine, 1984:326-7). ..' ..
It was a time in the socieues of Europe which Emile Durkheim might have
describedwithhiscencept of anomie.. Durkheimarguedthat the only somce of ~
.morality greater than the individual (and in a certain sense the only source of
morality at all) was found in the collectivity. But when those collectivities
collapsed, or were no longer seen as legitimate, the result was anomie, as
individuals becameestrangedfrom the collectivemorality,and found themselves
withoutresources to determineright from wrong (Durkheim, 1933:xxxiv-v).
Interestingly enough, the same social and historicalcontext in which Sartre
livedand developedhis viewsmay also have been in part responsible for the rise
of anti-semitism.
In Prophets of Deceit, (a book which formed part of the series Studies in
Prejudice of which The Authoritarian Personality was a part) by Leo Lowenthal
and NorbertGuterman,the riseof anti-semitism in America is discussedas being
in part a result of "socialmalaise." By "social malaise" they refer 10 the distrust
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of foreignersand foreign ways; the sense of ~elple~sn~ss many~ple feel; the
feeling that one is excluded from the good things In life; the anxiety or fear of
immanent disaster; and disillusionment with politics (Lowenthal, et. al., 1949:
13-14).
"Malaise is a consequence of thedepersonalization and pennanent~ity
of modem life. Yet it has never been felt among people so strongly as m the
past few decades. The inchoate protest, the sense of disench~bn~nt,and the
vague complaints and forebodings that are already JM:rcepbbl~ m the late
nineteenth century art and literature have been dlff~sed Into general
consciousness.... The intermittent and unexpected acts of Violence on the part
of the individual and the similar acts of violence to which whole nations am be
brought are indices of this underground torment" (Lowenthal. et, al., 1949: 11).
Lowenthal and Gutennan argue that the social malaiseis real and the anti-
semites are "right" to recognize it as real. The problem w~th the 8!'ti-semites,
however is that rather than attack the "real" cause of social. malaise, namely
either a~ "obsolete fonn of society" or "a poor organization of an adequate
society" the anti-semitesauack the Jews. ' ..
Furthennore modem rabid anti-semitism seems to belinked With the nse of
capitalism itself: in that Jews are often blamed for the depressions .and ?ther
irrationalities of the modem capitalisteconomy. Indeed,Max Ho~el~~r In an
essay entitled The Jews in Europe went so. far as to say.that.anb-semlbsm can
only be understand in the context of fascism, and fascism Itself can only be
understood as an outgrowth of liberal capitalism [Bronner et. al., (a ~ea~er)
1989:77-78]. (For more details on the subjectof the development of ~pltabsm
and anti-semitism see David Smith'sTheSocial Construction ofEnenues.)
One qualifier to the preceding points shouldbem~ clear.. Whate~er the
extentof social malaise and anomie in Europe or America, social malaise an~
anomie were not in themselves sufficient conditions to give rise to ann-
semitism or Sartre's humanism. Anti-Jewish f~I~~g~ have~n ~~u.n~ .~?~. a
centuries, .andmany people have emphasizedhumanfreedom In ~elr wnungs
», long before Sartre. What the social malaise in Etu?pe and~me~~a helped to
bring about however, was an increasein the popularity of anu-semiusm on both
continentsand perhaps even an increasein thepopularity of Sartre,at least for a
short while. · · · · tho
Many scholars became interested in the problem of anb-semlus~ In IS
era. Among them were Sartre and the critical theorists, Max Horkheimerand
Theodor Adorno.
ANTI-SEMITES AND AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITIES: .
Sartre wrote many times on anti-semitism, but his main work was Anti-
Semite and Jew. In it he drawsa charactersketch of anti-semites.
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Thecritical theorists of the Frankfurt School werealso interested in drawing
character sketches, The critical theorists concerned themselves with illustrating
whattheycalled authorirarian personalities.
This section of this essay will compare Sartre's portrait with the portrait
given by critical theory in an effort to synthesize the two views. It is hoped that
this synthesis will then shed light on the remainder of the essay which shall
concern itselfwith some solutions to the problem of authoritarian personalities
and their propensity to become anti-semites. The Authoritarian Personality by
Adorno, Frenkel-Bnmswik, Levinson andSanford, (andco-edited by Horkheimer
and FIowennan,) beginsstraight awayby arguing that,
"Although personality is a product of the social environment of the past, it is
not, once it has developed, a mere object of the contemporary environment.
What has developed is a structure within the individual. something which is
capable of self-initialed action upon the social environment" (Adorno. 1982, p,
6).
Notice, that the statement that personality is not merely an object, but is
also capable of self-initiated action upon the world bears considerable
resemblance to Sartre's own description of the human situation as one in which
humans are not merely a "given" but rather are free to attempt to choose
themselves by theirprojects in the world. It would seem that the authorsof The
Authoritarian Personality seea greatdeal of significance in the idea that human
beings are not completely determined by their biology (as evidenced by their
emphasis on social factors), society (as evidenced by their emphasis on
psychology and personality), norpsychology (asevidenced by theiremphasis on
thepersonality being capable of self-initiated action uponthe world).
The importance of self-initiated action upon the world should not be
un~eres~~ated, for "The present ~ters [of The Authoritarian Personality]
believe It IS up to the people to decide whether or not this country [America]
goesfascist" (Adorno, 1982: 10).
.Further.. evidence of the openness to .Sanre's -views (at least on anti- .
semitism) is given bya foomote in"the concluding remarksot' 'file Authoritarian
Personality, ThatfootIiote "reads,.' . 0
"There is marked similarity between the syndrome which we have labeled the
authoritarian personality and "the portrait of the anti-Semite" by Jean-Paul
Sartre (110). Sartre's brilliant paper became available to us after all our data had
been collected and analyzed. That his phenomenological "portrait" should
resemble so closely, both in general structure and in numerous details, the
syndrome which slowly emerged from our empirical observations ad
quantitatve analysis, seems to us remarkable" (Adorno, 1982: 475).
Theauthors of TheAuthoritarian Personality shareanother important feature
with Sartre which concerns the wayin which they begin theirrespective books.
Sartre begins bysuggesting thescenario of a dinner-party in which a discussion
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of Jews comes up. The host or hostess of the party, in order to keep the
discussion from becoming heated, says something like, 'everyone is entitled to
theirown opinion.'
'This word opinion...suggests that all points of view are equal; it reassures us,
for it gives an inoffensive appearance to ideas by reducing them to the level of
tastes, All tastesare natural; all opinions arepermitted" (Sartre, 1965: 7).
ButSartrerefuses "to characterize as opinion a doctrine that is aimed directly
at particularpersons and that seeks to suppress their rights or to exterminate
them" (Sartre, 1965: 7). In other words, Sartre refuses to tolerate intolerance.
(For a further critique of "dinner-party liberalism" see Sartre's essay What is
Literature, especially pages 145-169.)
The authors of The Authoritarian Personality would seem to concur, for
they arguein theirown inttoduction that,
'There is one explanation for the existence of an individual's ideology ['an organization of
opinions, attitudes and values' (Adorno, et, al., 1982: 2)] that has not so far been
considered: that is the view of the world which a reasonable man will organize for
himself. This conception...is of crucial importance.... Without it we should have 10 share
the destructive view, which has gained some acceptance in the modem world., that since all
idealogies, all philosophies. derive from non-rational sources there is no basis for saying
that one has more merit thananother" (Adorno. et al., 1982: 11).
In other words, all ideologies and all philosophies are not mereopinions or
tastes, and thereis a basis for sayingthat someideologies havemore merit than
o~~. .
Moreover, anti-semitism "issomething other than an idea It is firstof all a
passion." (Sartre, 1965: 10).
What Sartre seems to mean by arguing that anti-semitism is better
understood as a passion ratherthanan idea, is that for theanti-semite, his or her
hatred of theJews is not basedonany directexperience or contactwith specific
Jews from which an idea of "Jewishness" mightdevelop, but ratherJMt for the
_0 •••• anu-semite, "farfrom experience producing his ideaof theJew, itwas the latter
which explained his experienceII (Same, 1965: 13). In otherwords, a passionate
hatred of the Jews colors and distorts all actual experience with Jews for the
Anti-Semite.
The authors of The Authoritarian Personality refer to this idea (in pan at
least) as stereotypy, which "involves an inability .to experience Jews as
individuals" (Adorno. et. al., 1982: 94), because the anti-semite sees all Jews as
being one and the same. This tendency to see all Jews as one and the same
would indeed colorone'sindividual experiences withJews. Indeed, theauthors of
theThe Authoritarian Personality are skeptical of the possiblity. that interaction
of anti-semites with actualJewswould really changeanti-semitic beliefs. Their
skepticism is based on the reasoning thatwhatis needed is notactual experiences
with Jewsbut rathera newcapacity to experience (Adorno, et, al., 1982: 94-95).
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If all that is done is to increase interaction with Jews everything the Jew does
will still be turned against him or her. If the Jew attempts to be friendly, the
anti-semite, because of his or her inablity to truly experience the Jew as an
individual human being rather than as a stereotyped "Jew," will interpret the
Jew's friendliness as nosiness and prying. If the Jew keeps his distance in order
not to appear nosy and invading, the anti-semite will interpret the Jew as stand-
offish and clannish. Unless a new capacity to experience the Jew without the
lens of Jewish stereotypy that the anti-semitewears is establishedeverything the
Jew does will be turned against him or her. "One cannot 'correct' stereotypy by
experience; he has to reconstitute the capacity for having experiences" (Adorno,
et, al., 1982: 309).
Moreover, according to Sartre, anti-semitism is no ordinary passion, for
ordinarily people who choose a life of passion over reason "love the objects of
passion" not hate them.
Sartre furtherargues that the anti-semite choosespassionover reason,and/or
chooses to reason falsely, "because of a longing for impenetrability. The
rational man groans as he gropes for the truth; he knows that his reasoning is no
more than tentative.... But there are people whoareattracted to the durability of
a stone.... They wish not to change" (Sartre, 1965: 18).
Notice, that this longing for the durability of a stone is an act of bad-faith.
The anti-semiteattempts to escape from their condemnation to befree: from the
responsiblityfor their own actions: and from the anguish which can go with the
necessity to makeone's own choices. The anti-semite"choosesthe irremediable
out of fear of being free" (Sartre, 1965:27). ,
Sartre writes that the passion which the anti-semite has chosen, namely
hate, "is a faith; at the outset he has chosen to devaluate words and reasons.
How entirelyat easehe feels asa result" (Sanre, 1965: 19).
This devaluationof words and reason is crucial for, as the critical theorists
point out, "examination of the specific characteristics comprising the imagery
[of anti-semitism] reveals a basic contradiction in that no single individual or
.greupas awhole could ha.ve.allthese.characteristics" (Adorno, 1982: 94). For
instance,Jews (who are all supposed to bealike) are blamedfor both the "evils"
of capitalism andbolshevism! .' -". . ' .
In addition to arguing that anti-semitism is a passion Sartre argues that anti-
semitism is at the same time a "way of lookingat the world" (Sartre,'1965: 17).
The authorsof TheAuthoritarian Personality concur. Indeed, theyargue in their
discussionof the empirical work they have done on anti-semitism that "the first
conclusion to.be drawn...is that anti-Semitism is best conceivedpsychologically
not as a specific aversion but as an ideology, a general way of thinking about
Jews" (Adorno,1982:92).
This way of looking at the world is perhaps the most crucial aspect of anti-
semitism, for it represents "at bottem a form of Manichaeism. It explains the
courseof the world by the struggleof theprincipleof Good with theprinciple of
Evil" (Sartre, 1965:40). The good is represented by the Gentile; the evil by the
Jew. All one has to do to eliminate evil is eliminate the Jew. Good, for the
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anti-semite, thus consists of "purifying" society (Sartre, 1965: 43). "The
advantagesof this positionare many. To beginwith, it favors lazinessof mind"
(Sartre,1965:43).
This type of thinking is lazy because "The Good is already given." One
"has no need to seek it in anguish, to invent it, to scrutinize iL..to prove it...or,
finally, to shoulder the responsibilities of...mora! choice" (Sartre, 1965: 44).
This phrase, lito shoulder the responsibility of...moral choice" should be taken
very seriously. Recall that for Same, the entire weight of our existence rests
upon our own shoulders because we must make choices, including moral
choices, and no one or god can make those choices for us. To seek to shirk the
weight from our shoulders is 10 to seek to shirk what it means to exist,
This general way of thinking about the Jews, or as the authors of The
Authoritarian Personality put it, the idea that "to know one [Jew] is to mow all
[Jews]" (Adorno, 1982:94), is, according to Sartre, an act of bad-faith. It is not
simply that the anti-semite wants the dumbilityof stone for him or herself, the
anti-semitewants the durabilityof stone for theJew aswell.
The anti-semiteclaims on one hand that theJews shouldchange,and on the
other hand, that the Jews cannot change. This catch-22 is perhaps the full
expression of Manicheaism. Manicheaism is an act of bad-faith because it
pretendsthatJews arenot(in the Sartreansense of Iheword)free.
"But someone will object: What if he [theanti-semite] is like that only with
regard to the Jews? What if he otherwise conductshimself withg~ se~?"
Sartre replies that "that is impossible" (Sartre, 1965: 21). For anti-semitism
"involves the entire personality of the anti-Semite" (Sartre, 1965: 33). Indeed,
anti-semitism seems to represent the anti-semites overall primary choice of a
project in the world, i.e., their choice of character. Sartre goes on to add that
anyone "who finds it entirely natural to denounce other men cannot have our
conception of humanity" (Sartre, 1965: 21) The passionate hatred of the anti-
semite, according to Same, cannot merely be confined to the sphere of Jews.
The critical theorists would seem to agree. Indeed, at the conclusion of The
Authoritarian Personality, they.arguethat, "themostcrucial aspect of thepresent
study...is the demonstration. ofclose correspondence in the type of approach and. ,
outlook a subject is likely to have in a great variety of areas, ranging from the
most intimate features of family and sex adjustment through relationships to
other people in general, to religion and to social and political philosophy"
(Adorno, 1982: 475). In other words, the passion of the anti-semitec~not be
confined to one sphere. The anti-semite's personality will be affected In every
sphere of life (from family to religion to politics) by this Manichean world
view.
This tendency for one's (or the anti-semite's) personality to affect every
sphere of one's (or the anti-semite's) life is in part what leads Adorno to atu:mpt
to create a typology of personalities. This typology included what he descnbed
as the two most common personality types found in his research, namely, the
conventional and the authoritarian personality.
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.Adorno begin~ h~s chapter on types of personalities by discussing the
subject of typologies In psychological theory. Adorno admits that the use of
typologies in psychology has been subjected to a great deal of criticism. "At the
hub of all these arguments is. the a.version against .the application of rigid
~)~Pts to the supposedly flwd reality of psychological life" (Adorno, 1982:
Ad?mo enumerat~s the critiqueof typologies by adding that since the use of
typologies has been discredited for the mentally ill it would seem worthless 10
use typologi~s to classify the non-mentally ill (Adorno, 1982: 346).
Furthe~mo~e, It should~ot be fo~gotten, that the very cause against which The
Authoruarian Personality was wntten, namely Nazi Germanyand anti-semitism
used typologies to characterizeJews (Adorno, 1982: 348). Indeed, the Nazi
psychologist Jaenschdid this.
Adornoadmits that, "it cannot bedoubted that the critique of psychological
types ex~resses .8 ~Iy humane impulse, directed against that kind of
subsumption of individuals under pre-established classes which has been
~nsummated in Nazi Gennany" (Adorno, 1982: 348). BUI, Adornoadds Iaterin
his e~y, "there is a typological element inherent in any kind of psychological
theory (Adorn, 1982: 350),and to completely abandon the use of typologies in
psychology would be to abandon the use of psychology itself. This Adorno
warns us, would be as irrational any of the "'pigeonholing' schools" of
psychology (~dorno, 1982: 350). In other words,although it may be a humane
ImpUlse. to Wish not to typoIogize other people, the complete dismissal of
typologies would be tantamount to a complete dismissal of psychology itself
and such a dismissal would mean the end of an attempt to understand othe;
people.
It wouldseem typologies are necessary,but in acknowledging that they are
necess~ one should take care to explain that no individual is bound and
determmed by any typology used to describethem. In other words we must take
c~e that our tool (the typology) for explanation does not becomean act of bad-
"f~~ o~~,~.~~.P~.as it wouldbe if we posited that-others were not free•.
. Same would~m to concur. Rather than talk about typologies, Sartre
discusses overall pn.mary projects which a person 'chooses for themselves.
Same, however, remln~. us that at any moment we might choose to radically
change ourselves by giving up our pnmary project' and choosing a new one
(Sanre, 1956: 584-612).
. Ado~o discusses several personalitytypes but this essay shall limit itself10
a diSCUSSIon of the conventional and the authoritarian personality (or syndrome).
Parallels to other works bycritical theoristson the authoritarian personality will
bedrawn out, and. an anal>:sis of thegenesis of the authoritarian personality will
bepresented. T.hls analysis of the genesis of the authoritarian personality will
hopefully shed light on some solutions to authoritarianism.
"Thi~king in terms of ingroup and outgroup prevails" in personalites
characte~lzed by. th~ c?~ve?tional personality (Adorno, et, at, 1982: 158).
Conventional prejudice IS a matterof course:" and non-violent (Adorno,et, al.,
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1982: 158). This lack of violent tendencies, however, is a product of a general
acceptance of "the values of civilization and 'decency'" (Adorno. et, al., 1982:
158). Furthennore, the conventionalist tends to be "set against 'extremes' in
every respect" (Adonro, eL aI., 1982: 359). [If it is true that all that i~ needed
for evil to triumph in the world is for good men and women to do nothlO~, then
the conventionalist would seem to epitomize the type of person ~ho m!ght I~l
evil triumph by their inaction.l There is also the danger that If rabid anu-
semitism suddenlybecamepopular,i.e., conventional and normalin some sense.
the conventionalist might go along with it to the point of participating. This
idea is hinted at by Adomo's statement concerning die fact the conventionalist
lacles violent "impulses" because J!1ey are indecent according to the values of
civilization.[It is interesting to note that Sartre might call the conventional person a
non-person because the conventional person is neither for~ against the Jew.
Sartrechallenges his readers in Anti-Semite and Jew to take Sides. Better to be
for or against the Jews because if you do nothing then you are"not anything,"
noteven a person (Sanre, 1965:51).]
The authoritarian personality, on the other hand, is characterized by what
Frommand Freud called the sado-masochistic character. HerbertMarcuse also
discusses the authoritarian personalityand describes them as seeing themselves
as "heroic" men (Marcose,1988:4). .
In Negations. Marcuse argues thal"long before WorldWar I, the celebration
of a new type of man became prevalent" (Marcuse, 1988: 4). This new type
"was composed of traits from the age of the Vikings. German ~ysticism. the
Renaissance, and the Prussian military" (Marcuse, 1988: 4). This new type of
personwas "boundto the bees of bloodandsoil,"~ould ~vel "through hea~~
and hell." did not "reason why." but would go mto acuon to ~ and die.
(Marcuse: 4.) This "hero"seems like the perfectsoldier,proud.straight-backed,
and obedient This hero wasa personof actionnot contemplation.
This "hero" however, is actually sado-masochistic as Fromm made clear in
his widely read book Escape from. Freedom. The "hero" is sadisticbecause they
are willing to exterminate the outgroup (in our case the Jew) because the Jew
doesn'tbelongto the ingroup(boundby bloodand soil to eachother). .
Indeed.Sartreadds thatanti-semitism "represents a basicsadism" and that "it
is fun to bean anti-Semite" because"onecan beat and tortureJews without fear"
(Sanre, 1965:46-7).. Furthennore the "hero" is masochistic (or self-deslrUctive)
because they are willing to sacrifice themselves (both physically in terms of
their life, and humanly in termsof their freedom as they give thisf~O"! away
by following the orders of the military machine) in order to auam their end,
namely the "purification" of the homeland. Sartre wouldseem 10 concur. Sartre
arguesthat "masochism is the desire to haveoneself treated as an ~bjecl" (S~,
1965: 107). In as much as Sartreargues that the anti-semite acts IR ~d-f~th ':"
an attempt to be a "rock" (or an object) it would~m that ~e a~b-sen:lIt;els
masochistic. Sartre, however, rather than emphasize the anb-semlteS willing-
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ness to die for their blood and soil, places the emphasis on the anti-semites'
sacrifice of theirfreedom.
In The Working Class in Weimer Germany Fromm describes the
authoritarian personalityasanattitude that
"affirms, seeks out and enjoys the subjugation of men under a higher external
power, whether this power is the state or a leader, natural law, the past or God.
The strong and powerful are simply admired and loved for these qualities, the
weak and helpless haled and despised.i.. Sacrifice and duty, andnot pleasure in .
life and happiness, are the guiding aimsof the authoritarian attitude." (Fromm,
1984: 209-210).
Needless to say, the authoritarian sees the Jews and all outgroups as weak
and helpless in the physical sense, while at the same time seeing them as all
threatening in the economic sense. (Indeed, Hitler seems to indicate in Mein
Kampf that theJew is dispicablebecauseof his or her economicself-serving,and
that the Jew is evil because he or she is not willing to sacrifice him or herself
for the good of thegroup, whereas the true German is the exact opposite, willing
and able to sacrificehim or herselffor the glory of the homeland.)
Marcuse concurs with Fromm that "the strong and powerful are simply
admiredand loved for these qualities" (Fromm, 1984: 210), by the authoritarian.
~~cuse states ~at th~ image of the heroizing of humanity "expanded to the
VISIon of the charismatic leader whose leadership does not need to be justified on
the basis of his aims" (Marcuse, 1988: 4). In other words, in the minds of the
sado-masochistic self-proclaimed "heroes" the power the leader wields justifies
any actionsthe leader takes. .
Adorno concurs with this fmal point when he writes on the authoritarian
syndrome. Adornoargues that one featureof the authoritariansyndrome "is the
psychological equivalent of the 'no-pity-for-the-poor' ideology" (Adorno, et. al.,
1~82: 364). The authoritarian identifies (and finds gratification in identifying)
WIth strength. The weak or the "down"arethus rejected.
. . Adorno 'al~o concurs: that "the" "ingroup-outgroup dichotomy" is v~ry
. Impo~t.{or~~~.~Y"clrome(Adomo:.363)._ " _ *,-, , - .• '
It should benoted that the crucial ingroup-outgroup dichotomy is an act of
bad:faith if the ingroup and the outgroupare treatedas transcendeots (or rocks):
the ingroup loved because they belong to the ingroup (and not because of their
individual traitsor accomplishments): theoutgroup hated because they belong 10
the outgroup (and all their individual traits or accomplishments turned against
them).
. Much of what the critical theorists have to say about the genesis of
authoritariani~m and the ingroup-outgroup dichotomycentersaround the family.
For exampleIn The Authoritarian Personality Sanford argues that aggressionon
thepan of thechild is aroused in two ways, "silenceand distance" 00 the parent's
part when thechild "wants to be loved"and "authoritarian disciplinewithoutany
demonstration of its purpose" (Adorno,et al., 1982:398). In other words, a lack
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of love combined with punishment that is arbitrary, chaotic,and irrationalin the
sense that the child does not know what it is for, arouses hostility in the child.
Sanford argues, however, that this hostility, rather than being directed openly
towards the parent (or authorityfigure) is redirected elsewhere becausetheparent
"is conceived as too strong and dangerous" (Adorno, et al., 1982: 399).
Authoritarians submit to the powerful authority, and "gain a sense of adequacy
by participating psychologically" in the powerof the authority (Adorno,et a1.,
1982: 4(0). Notice, that what is frightening in all of this is that the powerful
authoritybecomes "right"becauseof their "might"
Recall that the hostilitygeneratedby a lackof loveand arbitrarypunishment
is often redirected. Since the authoritarianadmirespower, the hostility is often
redirected against the weak. Thus, the authoritarian fears weakness in him or
herself (Adorno, et al., 1982: 4(0), and hates it in others. The authoritarian
"thinksof people and groups in rigid categories of weak verses stong" (Adorno,
et al., 1982: 404). "If one asks why he [the aulhoritarian] cannot have pity for
weak people but instead actually hates them, thaanswer is two-fold. In the first
place, they remind him too much of his own weakness and all the dreadful fear
with which it is associated. Second, and probablymore important, he believes
weak people to be dangerous.... He believes they...resent it and will seek
revenge in time.... The feeling of being persecuted [asa child] aroused in him
[the authorirarian] the strongest impulses to violence...and he imagines that
'downtrodden' peopleare similarlymotivated" (Adorno, et al., 1982:405).
It should be noted that this vision of the world in terms of strong and weak
is similar to the Manicheanvision of good vs evil. And if Jews areperceived as
the weak, evil, and threating outgroup the authoritarian may choose 10 become
an anti-semite.
If the true source of susceptibilityto authoritarianism and anti-semitism lies
in being unloved.and subjected to irrationaland arbitrarypunishmentas a child
then it would' seem that the course for correcting theauthoritarian problem would
"be be clear. "All that is really.essential is. that children begenuinely Ioved.and..
. treatedas individual humans" (Adorno, et al., 479). The problem is that all the
features of a programdesigned to producenon-ethnocentric personalities "would
have the aspect of being more easily said than done." (Adorno, et al., p. 479).
There may, however,be other "solutions" worth considering.
SOME "SOLUTIONS" TO AUTIIORITARIANISM
One "solution" would be to appeal 10 the authoritarian's "susceptiblity to
external control" (Adorno,et al., p. 418).
''The appeal should not be made to his sympathy or to his conscience, but to
his fear and submissiveness. He must be convinced that arrayed against the
overt expression of his prejudices are the law, overwhelming numbers of
people, numerous conventional authorities and prestige figures.... Those who
stand for democracy...must convince him that they also have strengm" (Adorno,
et al., 1982: 418).
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Sanford points out that there is a paradox in using the authoritarian's
susceptibility to strength to encourage democratic tendencies-the paradoxbeing
that one is also increasing his or her susceptibility to anti-democratic
movements, providedthe anti-democratic movementshows strength. It should
be noted that Sanford's paradoxical "solution" does not eliminate
authoritarianism but simplymakesuse of it Furthermore, Sanford'sparadoxical .
"solution" does not help to keep individuals from developing authoritarian
personalities.
Sartre proposesseveralmethodsfor dealing with anti-semitism. The first is
what he callsa "concrete liberalism" (Sartre, 1965: 146). "By that we mean that
all persons who through their workcollaborate toward the greamess of a country
have the full rights of citizens of that country" (Sartre, 1965: 146). In other
words what makesone a citizen should bewhat one does for one's country, not
one's ethnic roots, race, or gender. Moreover one should not have to give up
their ethnicity, race or gender in order to bea citizen. Just as tlWomen...are not
asked to change their sex when they enter the votingbooth" (Same, 1965: 146),
no one should be asked to change their race or ethnicity when they become
citizens. Sartre argues that we must accept the FrenchJew with his "character",
"customs", "tastes", "religionIt, and "physical traits" as they are (Same, 1965:
147).
As far as more concrete means to the elimination of anti-semitism Sartre
argues that schooling is important in that he hopes it will teach students "to
avoid errors of passion" (Sartre, 1965: 147). Likewise laws against
discrimination have their place. But Sartre warns that "laws have never
.embarrassed and neverwillembarrass the anti-Semite, who conceivesof himself
as belonging to a mystical society outside the bounds of legality" (Same, 1965:
148). In other words, the anti-semiteis on a Manichaean missionand can do no
wrong as he or she sets about to exterminate the "evil" in the world. Sartre's
reasoning combined with Sanford's on the subject of laws and the appeal to
authorityfigures: for· me elimination of anti-semitism and authoritarianism· would"
thus seem to be somewhat skeptical.
.: Saftte'~Mgries~ihar the··:ultiiilafu solution to the'elimination of anti-semitism
lies in the eliminationof class struggle through the eliminationof class itself.
"Anti-Semitism manifests the separation of men and their isolation in the midst
of the community, the conflict of interests and the crosscurrents of passions: it
can exist only in a society where a rather loose solidarity unites strongly
structured pluralities; it is a phenomenon of social pluralism. In a society
whose members feel mutual bonds of solidarity, because they are all engaged in
the same enterprise (and thus have no differences based on class,] there would be
no placefor it."(Sartre, 1965: 149-150).
Notice the degree to which Sartre blamessocial structuresof associationfor
the development of anti-semitism. "It [anti-semitism] is a phenomenon of
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social pluralism." The separation of people from a real community based on
shared goals and enterprises would seem to be the result of a capitalist society
basedon competitiveand exploitiveclass relations. -
Sartre admits, however, that it is a lazy way out of the problem of anti-
semitism to posit that the socialist revolution is the answer. Sartre thus
continues by arguing that what is essential to be done is to point out to
everyone"that the fate of the Jews is his fate" (Sanre, 1965: 153). "If we do not
. respectthe person of the Israelite, who will respect us?" (Sartre, 1965: 151). No
one "will be free so long as the Jews do not enjoy the fulness of their
rights...[no one] will be secure so long as a single Jew...can fear for his life"
(Sanre, 1965: 153). .
The key to Sartre's plea for the fullness of the rights of the Jew lies ·in the
phrase, "If we do not respect the person of the Israelite, who will respect us?"
(Sanre, 1965: 151). In other words if we do not respect the Jew as a free human
being (as opposed to an unfree and demonic or mystical being) then who will
respect usas free human beings'! This argument in someways soundsas old as
the golden rule but in other ways is quite profound. For just as people in Nazi
Gennany were afraid of being called "Jew" eacb of us could be"Jewish," in the
sensethat someone or somegroupof peoplemight decidethat thereasonswe do
the things we do are not because we are free and made choices, but rather are
because we are Irish, or Black, or women, or men. To put it in the terms of
critical theory, unless we stop seeing others through the lenses of stereotypy,
others will never stop looking back at us using the same type of eyewear.
Furthermore, each of us could belong to a group designated as the root of all
evil. Misogynists have held women to be that group. American racists have
held blacks to be that group. And it is not diffieuh to imaginesomeoneholding
all while males to be that group.
It is true, in Sanre's thought, thatwe are all alreadyfree in the sense that we
can resist our jailers (or the others who in bad-faith attempt 10 define us-in the
case of the Jews- the anti-semites) but this does not make the jailer any less at
fatilt (Sanre, 1965: 136). . . .,',. '., . ' -..
.' The critical theoristsconclude•. as mentioned earlier, that in order to decrease
the chances of children developing authoritarian personalities all that is really
needed is that the child be loved and not punished in an arbitrary and capricious
way. Both Sanre's and the critical theorists' "solutions" would seem to offer
some small guidance to anyone responsible for caring after children, whether
theybeparents or teachers or day-care workers.
The guidencefalls into two categories which we shall refer to as punishment
and the golden rule.. In regards to punishment the critical theorists would argue
that the children in question should have the reasons for their punishment (or
constraints) spelled out for them in terms that they understand. This is
importantnot only in order for them to developa rationalworldview but also so
they do not begin to resent the authority figure and redirect their hostility to
"weak" outgroups. This is also importantso that the child does not grow up 10
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be susceptible to strong authoritarian leaders, irregardlessof what principles and
valuesthe leaderstandsfor.
The second bit of guidance involves using the golden rule as a means for
convincing children to not stereotype and discriminate against others. Sartre's
plea for us to realize that the fate of the Jew could be the fate of us all is
seemingly teachableat a very youngage, and indeedshould be re-taught at every
age since many adults seem not to beaware of it.
The extent to which teachers, parents and day-care workers can teach the
exact opposite of what is needed to avoid developingauthoritarian personalities
is frightening. We often teach children the anti-democratic idea that the only
thing that matters is having power. Everytime one hears a parent or teacher tell
a child not to do x,y, and z, and hear the parent or teacher respond to the child's
query as to "why?" because "I told you so" one has witnessed the heart of
fascism. Anyone responsiblefor the rearingof childrenwho chooses democracy
as one of their values must take care not to do this for by doing this one teaches
children to respect only that which is mightier than themselves, and to hate
anyonethey pereiveas weak.
CONCLUSION:
This essay has attempted to explain why some people of similar social
backgrounds become anti-semites and others do DOL In so far as the critical
theorists and Sartre were on target with their explanations the answer lies in a
character structure which seems especially likely to develop in a society
characterized by social pluralismand a lack of real community. Anything which
can be done to eliminate the development of authoritarian personalities would
thus help 10 curb the appeal of anti-semitism.
We must teach children that authoritariansand those who would go through
hell or high-water, without reasoning why, for King and country are not heroes
to be admired and imitated: that authoritarians and the perfect soldiers are not
pillars of courage, but rather that authoritarianism is at bottom an act of
cowardice. To choosethe durabilityot.stone for.one's self and.one's ingroup
(bound by blood and 'soil), and to choose the durability of stone for the hated
outgroup (in our case-theJews) is cowardly'because "itrepresents anattempt to
escape from one's freedom and responsibility. To choose not to reason why, but
rather only to do and die, again represents this same cowardice. If our children
must be taught tales of heroes then let us give them tales of heroes who think
for themselves before they act, who do not follow a leader merely because the
leader is strong, and who when they meet others meet individuals and not
preconceivedstereotypical constructions. In short, we must teach our children
true courage: the courage 10 stand tall and free as thinkers, fully responsible for
thechoices they make.
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A STUDY IN AMERICAN AGITATION:
J. EDGAR HOOVER'S SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF THE
COMMUNIST MENACE
Kevin Gotbam
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Mid-Am~rican Review of Sociology, 1992, Vol XVI, No.2: 57-70
Thisstudy is a content analysisofJ. EdgarHoover's Masters ojDeceit,
a major non-fiction bestseller published in 1958. By using the
theoretical insightsof the FrankfurtSchool, Hoover's anti-communist
treatise can be thematically analyzedas a specific type ofpropaganda
dissemination: agitation. This study will isolate and explain five
agiuuional themesemployedto symbolically constructthe Communist
Menace: 1. The False Religion; 2. The Apocalyptic End; 3. The
Dupes; 4. The Communist Conspiracy; and 5. Trust the FBI. By
probing beneath the manifest content of Master;) an effort is made to
decipher the latentcontent anddiscover thi implicit mechanisms used10
influence public thought.
In his forty-eight year tenure as the Director orthe FBI, J. Edgar Hoover
was lovingly referred to, among other praising epitomes, as "Public Hero
NumberOne," the "greatest," and "most wonderful American," and "America's
Rock of Gibraltar."1 Along with honorary degrees from nineteen of the most
prestigious universities and law schools, Hoover received numerous awards,
commendations, and certificates for "distinguished service," "integrity and
devotion to justice," and "selfless devotion to country and god." In 1946
President Truman presented Hoover with the Medal of Merit and in 1955
President Eisenhower awarded him with the National Security Medal and
..,Distinguished Federal CivilianService medaltn 1958. In 1964 in celebratory'
tribute ootQ his fortiethyearas FBIDirector, Hoover received 114plaques,scrolls", .
an<fawards (Donner 1980: 80).
These honors were only the lip of the iceberg of Hoover's enormous
popularity. Probably the most popular unelected government official in the
historyof the United States, Hoover's approving consensus is revealed not only
by the hundredsof awardshe receivedover the years, but by his persistenthigh
rankings in public polls. A 1953Gallup poll showed 78% "favorable" opinion
for the Director whileonly a minuscule 2% had an "unfavorable" opinion (20%
had no opinion). A ·1965 Gallup poll showed an 84% "highly favorable" rating
whilea May 1971 poll showeda 71% "excellent" rating for Hoover's governance
of the FBI.2
Hoover'senormouspopularity derivedfromhis exploitation of the perennial
American fear of radical change and symbolic defense of traditional American
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